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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Threats Inducing Emotional Reactions.
Showing blackjacks, the defendants threatened the plaintiffs with
physical harm, and because this offer to commit immediate bodily harm
generated great fear and distress, the plaintiffs became ill. On demurrer to the complaint, of which the above is a paraphrase, the court held
that: (1) there was no assault and (2) there was no action for the
alleged illness.1
As to the assault, there are many statements in the books which
seem to support the result since there was no allegation of an "overt
act." "Mere words do not constitute an assault" has been stated frequently by text writers2 and stated or implied by the courts. There appears to be no satisfactory explanation for such a result where the parties are face to face.3 The plaintiffs believed that the defendants would
carry out immediately their manifested intent of striking them unless
their orders were obeyed. These facts spell civil assault at common
law. There is in fact little judicial authority for the requirement of a
threatening movement. In many of the cases, including the one cited
by the court, 4 the statement that "mere words" are not sufficient is the
merest dictum.5 In some of the cases, it is said that there must be an
offer of corporeal harm, an ambiguous expression taken from textbooks. 6
Again these statements are mostly dicta. 7 The largest number of cases
in which the expression is used involve criminal assaults8 and, despite
an occasional case to the contrary, 9 it is generally recognized that the
1
Cucinotti v. Ortman, 339 Pa. 26, 159 A2d 216 (1950).
2 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 3.5 (1956) ; RESTATEmT, TORTS § 31 (1934).
' See PROSSER, TORTS § 10 (2d ed. 1955).
' Bechtel v. Combs, 70 Pa. Super. 503 (1918) (telephone threat).
Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091 (1913) (telephone threat);
Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (no force was threatened) ; Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (threats
by trespasser causing illness; recovery allowed).

'As in 1 COOLEY, TORTS §95 (4th ed. 1932).

'Brown v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S.W.2d 1 (1943) ; Tinkler v. Richter,

295 Mich. 396, 295 N.W. 201 (1940) ; Jenkins v. Kentucky Hotel, 261 Ky. 419, 87
S.W.2d 951 (1935) (dictum).
'State v. Daniel, 136 N.C. 571, 48 S.E. 544 (1904), is typical; holding that it
was incorrect for the trial court to charge that "if the defendant cursed the prose-

cutor, Alston, and ordered him to come to him and Alston obeyed through fear,
the defendant was guilty of an assault." the court said: "Mere words, however
insulting or abusive, will not constitute an assault, nor will a mere threat or violence menaced, as distinguished from violence begun to be executed ....
[T]he
defendant must have committed some act in execution of his purpose." State v.
Daniel, .supra at 573, 574, 48 S.E. at 544, 545.

'Texas Bus Lines v. Anderson, 233 S.W.2d 961 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (where

plaintiff was denied entrance to a bus but refrained from getting near enough to be
struck). See also Stark v. Exler, 58 Ore. 262, 117 Pac. 276 (1911), in which, in
a civil action for a battery, the court gratuitously says that a civil assault is the
intentional attempt to do violence to another.
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two species of assault have quite different elements. At common law,
criminal assault does not involve knowledge by the plaintiff of the defendant's conduct, as is true of civil assault; the latter, in turn, does
not involve an attempt to commit a battery,' 0 a usual requirement in
criminal assault, It may be that the distinction commonly made in the
criminal law between attempts and preparation, throws the cases involving only words into the latter category.'" On the other hand, without making an exhaustive survey of the cases, I have found a few which
support the position that activity by the defendant is evidence, but not
the only evidence, of the defendant's intent to strike immediately and of
the plaintiff's apprehension.' 2 The Advisors for the Restatement of
Torts, Second, have recommended a statement to that effect.' 3
The second issue involved a far more important matter than the
question whether a contemporaneous movement by the defendant is a
requirement for a technical assault. By its decision the court has placed
itself squarely against the progress made by the courts in the last half
century. There is here not merely an interference with the peace of
mind for which some other courts allow an action under similar circumstances, even though not resulting in physical harm.' 4 The action
is not one based upon negligence or other tortious conduct directed towards third persons which causes a mental shock with resulting physical
harm to the plaintiff who in some -states is denied a cause of action.' 5
This result is at least arguable, since otherwise an inadvertent defendant
might become liable to a large number of spectators witnessing a catastrophe.
1

1

REsTATEmENT, TORTS §§

21, 28 (1934).

As in Fennell v. State, 164 Ga. 54, 137 S.E. 762 (1927) ; Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 180 S.E. 395 (1935) (not an attempt to point a pistol at
plaintiff).
"Republic Steel & Iron Co. v. Self, 122 Ala. 402, 68 So. 328 (1915) (stated
that whether language constitutes an assault depends upon the manner and tone
of the speaker)d; Haup v. Evenson, 125 Iowa 634, 101 N.W. 520 (1904) (instruction found not bad which stated that assault is a menace by word or act, where
there was evidence of an apparent intent to carry ont the threat) ; Cressey v. Republic Creasoting Co., 108 Minn. 342, 122 N.W. 484 (1909) (instruction that a
wrongful threat to do bodily violence with present ability is good).
§s s31
(Tent. Draft No. 1 1957): "Words
"oRESTATEMENT (SECOND), TOR

do not make the actor liable for assault unless, together with other acts or circumstances, they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or
offensive contact with his person."
" State Rubbish Collectors v. Silignoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282- (1952), in
which both compensatory and punitive damages were awarded for the mental
suffering with faef§,similar iothe ones here dealt with. To avoid useless litigation,
recovety is properly limited to outrageous conduct. Gillianss v. Eastern Air
Lines,.194 F.24'774 (5th Cir. 1952); Wallace v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d
81 (Mdnic.,Ct.App.'D.C. 1946).
'dWaube V..WarHngtn', 276 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (as a matter of
social expediencO. The courts are more apt to find liability where the defendant's
act, although 'directed against a third person, is intentionally wrongful. Rogers v.
Willard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) (assault on plaintiff's husband in plaintiff's presence).' '"
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Again, our principal case is not one in which the defendant has been
negligent to the plaintiff but has not caused an impact, in which situation
the Pennsylvania courts have consistently denied damages for the physical harm resulting from the fear suffered by the plaintiff.16 Again the
result is arguable. Negligence does not necessarily connote personal
fault; it may result from a momentary inadvertence, to which all are
subject, or from ingrained stupidity, from which one cannot escape.
There is danger of fake testimony which, with the aid of partisan expert
witnesses, may mislead jurors into making a mountain out of a molehill.
Further, if there has been no impact upon the plaintiff, the defendant
may not even be aware of the incident for some time and hence be unable
to recall it or to get witnesses. It is clear that such cases require careful
and expert handling by the courts. But most courts have reached the
conclusion that an action should be allowed if the proof is clear.17
Whatever we may think about the negligence cases, it is obvious that
they afford no precedent for denying recovery in such a case as the
present in which the defendants deliberately set about disturbing the
plaintiffs' minds for the purpose of causing them serious worry. Beginning at least in 1897, the courts have allowed recovery where a defendant did an act or said words, intended by him to distress the plaintiff
and which he should have realized might affect the plaintiff's health.
Many of the cases involve misguided "practical jokers."' 8 There are
also the many cases, involving the recently protected right of privacy,
where there may be only bad judgment as to the proper limits to publicizing facts about the plaintiff'" or the overzealous acts of creditors who
exceed the bounds of propriety and whom the debtor can hold liable
although he has suffered only chagrin or embarrassment. 20 This type
of conduct is bad but certainly far less so than threats with blackjacks.
It is arguable that mere threats without resulting physical harm should
not be the subject of a civil action. But where the plaintiffs have become
ill from the threats (as we must assume from the pleading that they did),
the court should not leave them kithout redress. In fact the court in
" This is true even though the evidence of the plaintiff's physical deterioration

as a result of the fear is beyond question, as in Bosley v. Andrews, 303 Pa. 161,
142 A2d 263 (1958), where plaintiff suffered a heart attack caused by fear of
defendant's trespassing and threatening bull (a case mentioned by Mr. Justice
Musmanno in hopelessly dissenting).

"'The prevailing view is presented in Orlo v. Connecticutt Co., 128 Conn. 231
21 A2d 402 (1941). See the review of cases in 2 HAaRm & JAMEs, ToaRTs § 18.4
(1956).
"

Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (a "practical joker" told plaintiff

that her husband had been badly injured); Bielitzki v. Obadisk, 65 D.L.R. 627
(1922) (similar).

"Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (photograph
of plaintiff in disheveled clothes, two years after the accident of which she was the
victim).
2

Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956)
vasion of privacy).

(said to be an in-
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effect is telling the modern highwaymen how to ply their trade without
civil liability,2 1 except for their plunder. The formula is simple: "Show
your blackjacks, but don't move them or touch your victims."
WARREN A. SEAvEY*

Conflict of Laws-Tort and Partial "Release" in Different
Jurisdictions-What Law Governs Construction of Instrument.
At common law a release of one joint tort-feasor results in the release of all others. It makes no difference whether the respective acts
of the several tort-feasors were in concert, merely concurrent, or even
successive ;1 it matters only that the combined acts produced a single,
indivisible injury.2 The reason generally assigned for this result is that
a single injury represents a single cause of action, which cannot be split
by being released as to one tort-feasor while being preserved as to
another. A release is thus regarded as an absolute, unconditional extinction of a cause of action. 3 This reasoning gave rise to the judicial
presumption that a release, even if granted to less than all who were
(allegedly) jointly responsible for the injury, was executed only in
exchange for a complete satisfaction of the claim. It was the view of
the courts, therefore, that to allow the injured party to release one joint
tort-feasor and subsequently to recover a judgment from another theoretically would permit the victim to recover more than he had lost
Assuming the soundness of this reasoning at the time at which it evolved,
it is nevertheless highly questionable whether the use of this irrebuttable
presumption is a just method of preventing excessive recoveries now.
211 assume that the defendants might have been bound over to keep the peace
or been charged with an attempt at extortion.
* Babcock Professor of Law, Wake Forest College. Professor of Law eneritus,
Harvard University.
1
Intentional torts by their very definition at common law must have been concurrent in order to give rise to joint tort-feasorship. See Garrett v. Garrett, 228
N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948) ; PRossER, TORTS § 46, n. 29 (2d ed. 1955).
- Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 72 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ; Morris
v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956) ; PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
A few American jurisdictions have attempted to make a common-law distinction
(both in negligent and intentional torts) between tort-feasors who act in concert
and those whose acts are merely concurrent. Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119
F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941) (Idaho law) ; Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740
(1932). There is a considerable variance between the laws of the several jurisdictions as to the effect of a release given to one who is subsequently adjudged not
to have been jointly liable with those charged with the injury. See, e.g., Bolton v.
Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ind. 1953) ; Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal.2d
705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945) ; Holland v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 180
S.E. 592 (1935); Howard v. J. H. Harris Plumbing Co., 154 N.C. 225, 70 S.E.
285 (1911) ; Harris v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 1, 18 S.E2d 303 (1942) ; Papenfu§
v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W.2d 920 (1949).
'Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938) ; PRossER,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 46.
'Lysfjord v. Flintkote Co., 135 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Morris v. Diers,
134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).

